當詞彙進到各個領域的時候，詞語就會攜帶更多資訊量(Murphy & Lassaline, 1997) 。可以用紅酒課程來理解這段話。如果是一個紅酒新手的話，不論喝哪一瓶紅酒，大概都會有差不多的感覺，所有的紅酒都是「wine」。如果在紅酒課程中，反覆地聽到「這是Beaujolas，那是Merlot。」「那個甜甜的，這個比較澀！」這時候，我們會開始用「口感」去將感受到的紅酒進行分類，於是我們慢慢感受到紅酒之間也存在差別。(對此，Solomon (1997) 有不同的看法)
如果我們學習新詞如同紅酒課程一樣，在體驗的過程中接觸了詞語就學會新詞。在人為的任務下，接觸這些詞語使我們對於紅酒的特質感受更敏銳(Goldstone, 1994) ，只為接觸了這些詞語使我們可以放大不同紅酒之間的差異(Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) 。但這不是詞語使紅酒具有這樣的差異。有的人會搖搖酒杯，根據酒色去分辨紅酒；或者用不同的酒杯去看他們之間的差異。詞語只是一個「方便」的方法去區分彼此存在差異，除此之外沒什麼了不起的。
我們所學會的詞語會引導我們的行為模式和習慣(例如：空間推理)，也使我們進行抽象地推論(心智理論)，還讓我們可以對外在世界的事物進行分類(事物分類)。雖然詞語有這些可能性，但是所得到的證據都不夠強大到可以說空間推理、心智理論或事物分類一定是依靠語言而存在。反而，我們看到的是，這些能力都是獨立於語言之外而能直接運作的。
引用Bloom (2000) 的說法：在英語裡，如果平常你並沒有看球賽或接觸球類運動的習慣，你可能不知道Hat-trick(帽子戲法)是什麼意思。直到有人告訴你：「Hat-trick就是某個人連續得到三分的意思。」原本是沒有任何Hat-trick的想法、概念，但是現在有一個東西能夠用來指稱這樣子的概念。這個概念之所以能夠形成是透過語言這樣子的載具(vehicle of language)。這很像我們學會很多抽象詞語的過程。
一個看不到世界的盲人比起一個普通人，通常更不容易去感覺到人類各個面相的文化，因為他們無法看書、看表格、地圖、電視…等等。如果這個社會也沒有提供他接觸資訊的方法，那麼他將脫離社會和文化的互動，而這將造成認知上的缺憾。然而，這個並不是說普通人因為視力正常所以比較聰明或者因為視力促使了抽象概念的發展。我們可以用視力這個例子來理解語言。語言是用來交流意見的工具。它並不是使人類能夠產生想法、意見的源頭。語言是我們用來傳遞文化和保存文化的主要方式。我們可以說語言是一個工具，一個用來傳遞訊息的最佳工具。
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